Wednesday, May 27, 2026

Taliban surge exposes the failure of U.S. efforts to build Afghan army


  • Taliban forces have made tremendous progress in Afghanistan.
  • It questioned the U.S. efforts to establish a local army.
  • Many militias are also active in the country.

The defeat of the Afghan army when Taliban fighters occupied one provincial city after another provided clear answers for anyone who doubted the success of the two decades of U.S.-led efforts to establish a local army.

Although the budget for training the Afghan army is approximately $89 billion, it took the Taliban more than a month to put it aside.

Read | Taliban captures Kandaharat, Afghanistan; embassy personnel evacuated

In the past few days, insurgents have occupied every major city in Afghanistan-from Kandahar in the south to Mazar-e-Sharif in the north, Herat in the west to Jalalabad in the east.

They are almost standing at the door of Kabul now.

Afghan President Ashraf Ghani praised the Afghan Security and Defense Forces in a brief televised speech on Saturday, saying that they “have a strong spirit to defend the people and the country.”

Lack of resistance

Read | Six countries urge the EU to continue expelling Afghans

However, the lack of resistance of many Afghan troops remains shocking. Some gave up their positions, others reached an agreement with the Taliban to stop fighting and hand over their weapons and equipment.

US officials said that in some cases, the governor asked the security forces to surrender or flee, perhaps to avoid further bloodshed, because they believed that failure was inevitable.

Taliban fighters and local residents sit in an Afghan National Army (ANA) Humvee on the side of the road in Laghman Province.

Where no deal was reached, the Afghan army still seems to disappear.

An American official said: “Once morale drops, it will spread quickly, and that’s at least part of the reason.”

U.S. military officers have long worried that rampant corruption, well documented in parts of Afghanistan’s military and political leadership, will weaken the resolve of frontline soldiers to low salaries, malnutrition, and unstable supplies—some of whom have been away for months. Even a few years at the end of the isolated outpost, where they may be picked out by the Taliban.

For many years, hundreds of Afghan soldiers were killed every month.

However, as long as there is international support, the military will continue to fight, without any air evacuation casualties and professional surgical care standards in the Western military. Once that incident passed, their determination vanished.

“Will you give your life to leaders who don’t pay you on time and are more interested in their future?” asked another US official who asked not to be named.

This is an analysis shared by some of the Taliban movement itself.

A Taliban commander in the central Ghazni province said that as soon as the U.S. military withdrew, the government began to collapse, “because they have no ideology other than plundering Americans.”

He said: “The only reason for the accidental fall of the provinces is our commitment and the withdrawal of US troops.”

America’s failure

This failure highlighted the failure of the United States to build a combat force with aggressive, well-trained leadership, high-tech weapons, and seamless logistical support with its highly specialized military image.

Theoretically, the number of soldiers in the Afghan security forces is about 300,000. In fact, the numbers have never been so high.

As more and more cities fall into the hands of the Taliban, relying on a small number of elite special forces to divert from the province to the province, the already high rate of deserters in the regular army has soared.

As the government forces began to fall apart, local militias loyal to Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum in the northern province of Faryab or leaders of famous regions such as Ismail Khan in Herat were also hurriedly recruited. Rush into battle.

Western countries have long been vigilant against such militias.

Although more in line with the reality of traditional Afghan politics, that is, personal, local, or ethnic relations are more important than loyalty to the country, they are also prone to corruption and abuse, and ultimately prove to be no more effective than traditional forces.

As the Taliban advanced and the Khan surrendered to the rebels, Dostum fled to Uzbekistan.

However, whether it is a realistic goal to establish a Western-style military with a 40% literacy rate and a social and political culture that is far from the developed national consciousness that supports the U.S. military is a realistic goal in one of the poorest countries in the world. Target. Open-ended questions.

The US Army trainers who work with the Afghan army strive to teach the basic courses of military organizations, namely that supplies, maintenance of equipment, and ensuring that troops receive proper support are the keys to success on the battlefield.

Jonathan Schroden, an expert at the CNA Policy Research Institute who served as an advisor to the Central Command of the U.S. Central Command and the U.S.-led International Forces in Afghanistan, said that the Afghan army is both an “employment plan” and a combat force. The country that receives the salary, it is the source of the salary.”

Elite Special Forces

However, the long-term failure of logistics, hardware, and human support for many units means that “even if they want to fight, they will exhaust their combat capabilities in a relatively short period of time.”

After the requests for supplies and reinforcements were not responded, the Afghan army was repeatedly forced to give up, either because the system was incompetent or the system was unable to provide simple delivery capabilities.

Even the elite special forces that have taken the brunt of the battle in recent years have suffered losses.

In July, after running out of ammunition and forced to surrender, Taliban militants executed at least 12 commandos in the northern province of Faryab.

Former American diplomat Richard Armitage organized a fleet of South Vietnamese naval ships to transport approximately 30,000 refugees out of Saigon before the fall of Saigon in April 1975. He witnessed a similar occurrence in Kabul. The threat of disaster.

When the United States invaded in 2001, as Deputy Secretary of State under former President George W. Bush, he was deeply involved in Afghan diplomacy.

He said that the collapse of the Afghan army showed a broader failure of two decades of international efforts.

“I heard people express in the media their frustration that the Afghan army cannot fight a protracted war,” he said.

“I can assure you that the Afghan army has already fought and can fight. If it has a trigger and something comes out of the barrel, they can use it.”

“The question is, is this government worth fighting for?” he said.

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