Raluca Csernatoni wrote that this technology is becoming too geopolitical, especially in the current global semiconductor shortage.
Raluca Csernatoni is an expert in the field of European security and defense. Carnegie Europe in Brussels focuses on emerging and disruptive security and defense technologies.
Semiconductors, also known as microchips, are the backbone of today’s interconnected world. From old low-end chips used in the automotive industry to high-end chips required for cutting-edge products such as PCs and smartphones, semiconductors are the “brains” of all electronic devices.
The continuing global shortage is a major problem. Why is it so?
This crisis is related to a combination of different events and factors. The culprit was the snowball effect of the COVID-19 pandemic, which shut down chip production facilities, but also triggered high demand for personal electronic devices for millions of people working from home.
Another factor is China-U.S. Technology trade war, Washington imposed trade restrictions on China’s largest chip manufacturer (Semiconductor Manufacturing International-SMIC).
This political battle on the ground has put pressure on non-Chinese manufacturers that are already operating at full capacity.
Finally, Taiwan, the largest player in the semiconductor manufacturing industry, has experienced its worst drought in more than a century-the chip production process requires large amounts of ultrapure water. Therefore, the already severe situation has increased the bottleneck.
Today, the United States (Intel) competes in many aspects of advanced production processes such as chip design and manufacturing. However, cutting-edge chip manufacturing and assembly are most concentrated in Asia, mainly in Taiwan (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company-TSMC), then South Korea (Samsung Electronics), and Europe is only a secondary player.
As the pandemic has exacerbated manufacturing lag in the past two years, chip shortages have prompted states to seek autonomy and support production in this strategic area.
Therefore, the continuing global chip shortage has exposed the geopolitical risk of technological dependence and the concentration of chip manufacturing in only a few countries.
Obtaining high-end microchips is not only critical for industry, but also for national and international security.
The United States has been discussing large-scale investment and incentives under the two parties American Bargaining Chip Act Support local manufacturing, R&D and supply chain security.
Maintaining the advantages of semiconductor innovation and supporting the flexibility of the supply chain has become a key strategic focus for Washington.
This highlights the fact that semiconductors, as’Basic technology‘Is considered to be the key to economic performance and military strength in the digital age.
Similarly, the EU’s goal is to strengthen the resilience of the supply chain and increase European shares in order to reach the goal of top chip manufacturers. The goal is to obtain a 20% share of the global market by 2030.
In her latest annual State of the Union address speech, European Commission President Ursula von der Lein proposed another initiative aimed at enhancing the technological sovereignty of the European Union, namely European Chip Act.
It intends to send a political signal that the European Union hopes to join the global chip race and expand domestic research and manufacturing capabilities.
To this end, the European Commission has recently launched European Processor and Semiconductor Alliance, Bringing together EU member states, companies, research and technology organizations.
According to the EU Internal Market Commissioner Thierry Brittany, Through the “European Chip Act”, our technological sovereignty is within reach.
Or is it? The EU’s ambitions for chip sovereignty may indeed be misplaced, especially when it comes to producing cutting-edge chips that require a lot of time and money to develop.
Political rhetoric surrounding this goal abounds.
It is very difficult to gain control of production and an upward foothold in the supply chain. The EU is late.
this Semiconductor Industry It is highly concentrated, specialized, innovation-driven, extremely capital intensive, and, importantly, it is controlled by integrated players in Asia and the United States.
The EU’s other major obstacles are its own single market competition rules and history of keeping public subsidies to a minimum.
However, European technological sovereignty The framework may help to convince member states of the merits of “more EU” in coordinating technological innovation and industrial efforts.
In addition, pursuing strategic autonomy alone is not always the most feasible method. Partnerships with trusted countries and business participants are just as important, and even more important.
This explains Commissioner Breton’s Recently visited Go to the United States, Japan, and South Korea to make efforts to produce onshore and attract high-end manufacturing to Europe.
In order to attract the interest of chip manufacturers, the EU can take advantage of its huge research ecosystem, scientific and industrial capabilities in key technical fields, and a skilled labor force.
Two European success stories are worth mentioning. Belgian Inter-University Microelectronics Center-IMED is an international research and development organization and a leader in the field of semiconductor research.
The Dutch multinational ASML is an innovation leader in the semiconductor industry, manufacturing complex machines that are critical to the production of microchips.
Strategic technology alliances are equally important.The commitment to semiconductors and rebalancing the global supply chain is also in Pittsburgh EU-U.S. Trade and Technology Commission Calendar for September 2021.
The council seems to be the best forum to discuss joint strategies and find common ground to promote the security of their respective supplies. In addition to promises, it remains to be seen how this will work in practice, such as trying to avoid a global semiconductor “subsidy race” with the United States and other participants such as South Korea and China.
Although the EU’s chip sovereignty plan is taking shape, the EU should concentrate on cultivating an innovative and friendly ecosystem in Europe and provide a large amount of funds in Europe to support local technology plans in chip design and manufacturing.
