The Inspector General’s report found that when dozens of pro-Trump thugs beat up police officers with bats, poles and other weapons, the Capitol police did not adequately respond to the police’s crazy calls for help. They pressed the panic button on the radio to seek immediate Back-up.
The report obtained by the Associated Press provides new details on the deficiencies in law enforcement during law enforcement Uprising on January 6 In the Capitol.
U.S. Congressional Riot: Police who endured violence from the riot testified for the first time
The report found that most emergency situations in police officers’ radios were never simultaneously broadcast on police radios. This is a standard protocol designed to promote emergencies and crises to other police officers. The report stated that the on-duty commander did not seem to realize that at least some of the systems were activated.
Police officials in Washington are increasingly worried about the planned rally on federal land next to the Capitol on September 18, which organizers said was aimed at “justice” for hundreds of people who have been accused in connection with the January rebellion. .
The report stated: “If you cannot get help or request reinforcements in an emergency, the police officer is at risk of dangerous or even fatal situations.” Troops or resources. If the duty commander on duty is not notified of the activation of the emergency identifier, they will not be able to respond to the situation.”
The Congressional Police said that senior department officials had been using their cell phones on January 6 to communicate orders to others downstream in the chain of command to limit the number of radio transmissions broadcast.

The results of the investigation of the emergency radio system are included in the “quick report” of the Congressional Police Attorney General, which is a series of assessments of how the agency had deficiencies in its handling on January 6 and how it could do better in the following areas The fifth future. Previous reports focused on the agency’s handling of intelligence and threat assessments. Taken together, these reports all showed a flawed pattern of preparation and response to the violence that day.
The July report focused on deficiencies within the Capitol Police Command and Coordination Bureau, which, among other duties, is also responsible for preparing for special events and managing emergency responses to the Capitol complex. The inspector general elaborated on what it referred to as outdated and vague policies and procedures and preparation issues. Coordination and emergency planning.
The Congressional Police said in a statement that its policies and procedures are being updated and “a comprehensive training plan is being developed.”
“USCP admitted that there was a communication interruption on January 6. Considering the incident on January 6, it is not surprising that the large amount of radio traffic that day was. In addition, the scale and magnitude of January 6 made it difficult to respond to each officer’s response in real time. Emergency radio broadcast,” the statement said.
For police agencies, a complicated problem is that the number of emergency calls is so large that the police cannot contact them at the same time.
A law enforcement official said that because too many police officers pressed the emergency button, other police officers were unable to respond to all calls at the same time and needed to prioritize emergency situations. The official discussed the report with the Associated Press on condition of anonymity because it has not been released publicly.
The report specifically criticized how the department managed the emergency activation system that officials used to request help during a crisis.
Of the 36 emergency systems activated that day, the inspector general only found 13 in the radio communication records. The report stated that although there may be additional activations, they are not reflected in the transcript, “it is clear that not all activations are performed at the same time.”

In addition, the report stated that command center officials do not always ensure that the duty commander is even aware that the system is activated.
The survey results clearly deviated from the way the system should work. The watchdog report quoted a standard protocol, showing that when an officer activates the radio emergency system, the officer’s name and personal identification number appear on the dispatch console, and then the dispatcher needs to broadcast the emergency situation on all talk groups at the same time Center and place the unit on standby at any time.
The report stated that failure to respond appropriately to the activation of the emergency system “will expose police officers to greater risks.”
The Congressional Police said it has been working to improve communication during major incidents and is deploying “new and improved policies, practices and procedures” to monitor emergency signals and communicate with other law enforcement agencies. The force also hired a retired Secret Service agent to help plan major events.
© 2021 Canadian Press





