Considering that the width of the English Channel has not changed, it is surprising that British politicians are often surprised by the proximity of the channel. France.
At present, Priti Patel is angry at the number of people crossing the border by boat.Boris Johnson vs. Patel couldn’t stop the trafficConservative MPs who told voters that Brexit had ensured national security were horrified to find that their bragging was premature.
The UK alone cannot deal with immigration from Canada. The Minister of the Interior and the Prime Minister tried to accuse the French authorities of lax policing, but then realized that it was foolish to confront a government they desperately needed help.
The problem is that there are two aspects to the boundary, and the goals that can be achieved only by “recovering control” are limited. In addition, Brexit theorists are puzzled by water. They viewed the ocean in western Britain as a maritime highway for cargo transportation, and the much smaller ocean on the southeast side as a moat to prevent people from entering. In 2018, Dominique Raab Shocked the conference hall He admitted that he “has not fully understood” the extent to which the British economy depends on the Dover-Calais trade.
Managing EU borders after Brexit is always tricky. When relations with Paris are strained, the situation gets worse. Immigration is only one of the tensions. Access to fisheries is another matter.Emmanuel Macron was excluded because of his country recent United Kingdom-Australia-United States (Aukus) security partnership agreement.
Downing Street sees the French president as the enemy of Brexit, and he preached a fear of the British in Brussels. Macron does take a hard line on anything that might undermine the single market or weaken the unity of the European Union. That’s because he believes that the European project is an amplifier of French power. In addition, the presidential election will be held next year, and the current president will face Euro-skeptics challengers. He can provide a positive anti-Brussels case study for his competitors without an annoying neighbor.
Ministers talked about Macron’s attitude towards domestic audiences, indulging in indulgence, as if this is a unique foreign practice, unknown in the outspoken Britain. According to reports, once next year’s Elysee Palace polls are over, Downing Street will plan to hold a grand settlement.There is an in-depth discussion of strategic partnerships based on Lancaster House Agreement David Cameron and Nicolas Sarkozy signed in 2010.
As far as the two largest military powers in Western Europe share long-term security benefits beyond the cod quarrel, this is a seemingly reasonable ambition. In addition, the issue of national defense is mainly a concern of a nation-state, even for the EU’s most integrated leaders.
The Lancaster House Treaty was signed between two EU member states. Brexit The logic of this partnership is not eliminated, but the Johnson administration pretends that its foreign policy with the mainland capital and the trade relations mediated through Brussels are independent of each other and have little connection, thus making its life more difficult.
Lord Frost Clear at this point, Describing the future relationship with the EU as a patchwork of bilateral transactions with member states. The Foreign Secretary Liz Truss doesn’t seem to consider European relations as part of her job at all (perhaps because Frost has bitten out this part of her job).
The depreciation of the relevance of the EU is a requirement for the belief in Brexit. Accepting Macron’s pro-EU stance reflects a rational assessment of his national interests, and it is possible to admit that the same dynamics have been applied to this side of the strait. After all, the two countries have a lot in common. But this is the remaining argument (although poorly expressed in the campaign).
Therefore, there must be other reasons why the relationship with France has become so difficult. Speaker of the House of Commons, Jacob Bres-Mogg, Suggest Last month’s conversation was particularly tricky because “the French were always grumpy in October and the anniversary of Trafalgar and Agincourt made them feel uneasy”. Even if he is not serious, it also illustrates the degradation of British political culture, that is, when cabinet ministers intervene in subtle issues in diplomatic relations, seriousness is not necessary. No one in France felt the need to mention the Battle of Castillon.
The naive impulse towards medieval wars, Napoleon and the Third Reich is a way for Brexitists to deny the contemporary economic and strategic realities of European projects. If the EU’s immutability and secret agenda were encrypted in the events before the Rome Treaty, there is no need to analyze it based on modern facts or even recent history.
Parochialism masquerading as historical knowledge is a chronic syndrome of conservative Euroscepticism. This is Johnson’s preferred idiom as a propagandist, especially because it relieves him of the responsibility to participate in the details. But it did not translate into actual government. It fuels the illusion that Britain can formulate a foreign policy against the great powers of the Old World and avoid contact with their modern interests as a member of the European Union. This is the core of the misunderstanding with France, and the relationship will not be resolved until it is resolved. The reality of Europe in the 21st century cannot be hoped to disappear, just as the strait can become wider.
