Antonia Colibasanu writes that the purpose of the “Blue Home” strategy is to allow Turkey to dominate the Mediterranean and to regain the commercial and maritime power that was once controlled by the Ottoman Empire.
Antonia Colibasanu Geopolitical futures‘Chief Operating Officer. Geopolitical Futures (GPF) was founded in 2015 by George Friedman, an international strategist and author of The Next 100 Years. A longer version of this article can be found here.
With Turkey’s dream of joining the European Union dashed, Ankara has shifted its strategy to the West. This is most obvious in the Eastern Mediterranean. The latest move by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan-visiting the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and announcing the resumption of Turkish energy exploration in the area-is intended to show that he will continue to pursue his new Ottoman Empire “Vivatan” (Blue Home) doctrine.
In the current climate, the feasibility of developing any large-scale discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean is debatable, but Turkey needs to curb the conventional threats along its coastline. In this case, energy exploration may be the best excuse. At the same time, Erdogan may use the possibility of a new crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean to distract the Turks from domestic economic problems that may undermine his rule.
Erdogan’s trip to North Cyprus came three days after the Turkish UN special envoy and the UN Secretary-General had a conversation about Greece’s “continued flagrant violation” of international law in the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The envoy stated that Athens violated the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne by militarizing the islands near Turkey, which should have remained demilitarized.
Ultimately, Turkey hopes to amend or cancel the treaty, which gives Greece sovereignty over islands close to the Turkish coast, including the right to explore and extract natural resources from the sea, thereby depriving Turkey of its important exclusive economic zone.
Although the opening of Varosha and the statement on the Cyprus two-State solution made headlines, it is worth noting that Erdogan also stated before the visit that Turkey will continue to conduct energy exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This statement seems to weaken the previous statement that promised not to be provocative.
It is the discovery of energy resources that has rekindled the long-standing dispute between Turkey and Greece. In 2019 and 2020, Turkey dispatched earthquake research ships to disputed waters in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, intervened in the Libyan civil war, and signed a maritime delimitation agreement with Tripoli. Tensions between Ankara and Athens have increased.
In fact, compared to a few decades ago, the region was found to be in a completely different reality at the beginning of the 21st century. The re-emergence of Russian threats, increasingly aggressive Iran, the weakening of the European Union due to its socio-economic problems, and the growing anti-Turkish coalition in the Middle East have forced Ankara to reconsider its position in the region. In addition, the country’s economic problems—predating the pandemic but becoming more and more complex since the pandemic—have been included in the government’s list of problems.
Since Turkey realized that it is no longer feasible to join the European Union, relations between the two countries have slowly deteriorated. Divided Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004, while Turkey only successfully completed one of the 35 negotiation chapters. Turkey has not formally abandoned its desire to join the European Union, but its efforts have shifted to updating the EU-Turkey Customs Union and visa liberalization.
The socio-economic crisis in Europe, coupled with the refugee crisis, caused Ankara to change its relations with Brussels. Considering that one of the main immigration routes from the Middle East passes through the Aegean Sea, Turkey and the European Union (especially Greece, as the first receiving country) have to cooperate in managing the flow of immigration. When Turkey emphasized the militarization of the islands by Greece, it was largely related to the placement of security personnel to ensure that migration flows were properly managed and the risks faced by locals were minimized.
At the same time, Turkey is trying to establish itself as an important transit country in the natural gas supply corridor in southern Europe by participating in the TANAP and TurkStream pipelines that transport natural gas from the Caucasus and Russia, respectively. When energy was discovered in the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey’s desire to become a regional energy center increased even though hopes for improved relations between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece have diminished.
After the failure of the last round of negotiations on the fate of Cyprus in 2017, the Republic of Cyprus announced the exploitation of its mineral deposits. Turkey condemned this decision as a violation of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots and launched a “gunboat policy”, sending warships to stop this move, and conducting its own exploration in disputed areas.
Turkey, Cyprus and Greece are not alone in the new energy game emerging in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first beneficiary of natural gas in the region is Israel, which has become a natural gas exporter since the discovery of natural gas in 2010. Egypt joined the club in 2011. The complex relations between the two countries and Turkey have further aggravated Turkey’s position in the region, especially after the first natural gas discovery, the relations between Greece, Cyprus and Israel have become closer.
Countries subsequently established exclusive economic zones in areas where energy was discovered. This has led to certain areas being occupied, so it makes Turkey feel like it has been locked in a box again-for an aspiring regional power, this is not a happy result. Therefore, it has formulated a “Blue Home” strategy, in which Turkey will develop its navy and strengthen its ability to protect Turkish interests overseas.
Under Erdogan’s rule, it has become synonymous with designated sea areas, which are said to have been unfairly deprived of Turkey’s neighbors overseas. For example, the Blue Homeland is the reason for Turkey’s intervention in Libya. The operation signed a bilateral treaty in 2019 to delineate an exclusive economic zone with Libya in the Eastern Mediterranean. Erdogan hopes to create a corridor between the Greek positions in the Aegean Sea and the gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean, and to control the space through which a potential underwater gas pipeline will pass, which will be built and served by a Greek-Cyprus-Israeli consortium .
The purpose of the Blue Home Strategy is not only to expand Turkey’s influence abroad, but also to pursue many of Turkey’s domestic and financial interests. This concept implies the idea that Turkey should dominate the Mediterranean and retake the commercial and maritime power that was once controlled by the Ottoman Empire. It believes that Turkey’s geographic location is an asset, not a weakness.
Having a strong naval power in the Mediterranean, especially the Eastern Mediterranean, will enable Turkey to claim oil and natural gas reserves in disputed waters. This in turn will help Ankara become an energy center and achieve energy independence, and the ruling party can use the re-emergence to distract voters from Turkey’s economic difficulties.
